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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
Eastern Minerals & Chemicals Co., a creditor of Delta 
Carbonate Inc., appeals an order of the District Court 
precluding it from seeking recovery from Delta's sole 
shareholder, Gary Mahan, on an alter ego theory because 
Eastern should have pursued this claim in the context of 
Delta's bankruptcy case. We conclude that the District 
Court misapplied claim preclusion in this bankruptcy 
setting. Therefore, we will reverse the District Court's order 
granting Mahan's motion for summary judgment. 
 
Eastern also appeals the District Court's denial of its 
motion to amend its complaint to add a RICO count against 
Mahan and to join other defendants believed to be jointly 
and severally liable. The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Eastern's motion, and therefore we 
will affirm as to that order. 
 
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. We exercise plenary review over a district court's 
order granting summary judgment. See New Jersey 
Turnpike Authority v. PPG Indus., Inc., 197 F.3d 96, 104 (3d 
Cir. 1999). 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Eastern was party to a sales agency contract with 
Bestone, Inc., a business in York, Pennsylvania that mined 
a quarry and produced calcium carbonate. In 1989, Delta 
acquired Bestone's assets and assumed Bestone's 
contracts, including the Eastern contract. Delta, which is 
solely owned by Mahan, was one of a group of companies 
owned or partially owed by Mahan, including Millington 
Quarry, Inc. and PenRoc, Inc. In January 1994, Delta and 
PenRoc both filed petitions for relief under chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code,1 and Delta liquidated its assets in the 
context of its chapter 11 case. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The cases were administratively, but not substantively, consolidated. 
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Eastern actively participated in Delta's bankruptcy case 
by challenging various actions and decisions of Delta, 
consulting with other creditors, and exploring alternatives 
for maximizing its return. Eastern opposed Delta's proposed 
rejection of its sales agency contract with Eastern pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. S 365 and sought reconsideration of the 
Bankruptcy Court's approval of the rejection, which also 
included a request for acknowledgment of an equitable lien 
on certain contracts. App. 437a-439a. Based on the 
rejection of its contract, Eastern filed a proof of claim for 
over $2.2 million in Delta's bankruptcy case, to which Delta 
objected. As discussed below, Eastern ultimately agreed by 
consent order to reduce its claim to $900,000. App. 674a. 
 
Eastern was quite aggressive in challenging Delta and its 
dealings with affiliated entities at every turn of the 
bankruptcy case and repeatedly asserted that Delta had 
been used for the benefit of the affiliated companies, 
primarily Millington, to the detriment of Delta's creditors. 
Eastern circulated a draft application to disqualify Delta's 
counsel, asserting that he could not properly represent 
Delta in light of his representation of PenRoc, had not 
disclosed facts relevant to his representation as debtor's 
counsel, actively concealed facts, and arranged for 
employment of special counsel that was not disinterested 
by virtue of its prepetition claim against Delta. App. 405a. 
It also attempted to disqualify Delta's special counsel, 
asserting that counsel was a prepetition creditor of Delta 
and thus was not disinterested, and that counsel had an 
actual conflict of interest based on its representation of 
Millington. App. 452a-454a. Not only did Eastern object to 
Delta's request for appointment of appraisers and 
consultants in connection with the valuation and sale of 
Delta's assets, alleging that they were not disinterested 
because they previously had performed services for 
Millington, App. 27a, but it also objected to a proposed sale 
of Delta's assets, alleging that the sale was not proposed in 
good faith and that such a sale should go forward only in 
the context of a confirmed plan of reorganization. App. 
254a-255a. 
 
Eastern attached to its objection to the sale of Delta's 
assets a draft complaint seeking equitable subordination of 
 
                                3 
  
certain claims of Millington and its primary lender 
Chemical Bank to the claims of Eastern and other 
unsecured creditors under section 510 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. App. 272a.2 The committee of unsecured creditors 
("Committee") also sought leave of court tofile a complaint 
on behalf of the estate requesting, inter alia , equitable 
subordination of the claims of Millington and Chemical 
Bank.3 Both complaints allege that Millington and Chemical 
Bank obtained liens on Delta's assets without any lawful 
basis and improperly received $4.3 million in postpetition 
payments from Delta. App. 380a.4 Eastern did not seek to 
subordinate any claim held by Mahan himself,5 although 
the complaint included a description of how Mahan 
allegedly engaged in conduct causing Delta to prefer 
Millington over Delta's other creditors. App. 289a. These 
complaints were never filed, and there was never afinal 




2. A court may subordinate an allowed claim for purposes of distribution 
under principles of equitable subordination. 11 U.S.C. S 510(c). Most 
courts have required a showing that the claimant engaged in inequitable 
conduct resulting in injury to creditors or unfair advantage to the 
claimant, and that equitable subordination of the claim is not 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See Citicorp 
Venture Capital, Ltd. v. Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims, 
160 F.3d 982, 986-987 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Noland, 
517 U.S. 535 (1996)). 
 
3. The Committee's request was based on the improbability that Delta, as 
debtor-in-possession, would file such a complaint itself; an affidavit of 
the chairperson of the creditors' committee asserted that "in light of the 
fact that one of the proposed defendants, Gary Mahan, is the 100% 
shareholder of the Debtor and at least a 51% shareholder of another 
proposed defendant, Millington, it is unrealistic to expect the Debtor to 
be able to bring the actions set forth in the complaint." App. 369a. The 
Committee's draft complaint named Mahan as an additional defendant, 
but not with respect to the equitable subordination count. 
 
4. The Committee's draft complaint further alleges that Millington and 
Chemical Bank "demonstrated a callous disregard for the rights of the 
Debtor and its unsecured creditors and have proceeded to improve their 
position without regard to the such parties, the facts, or the law." App. 
380a. 
 
5. Mahan had a claim against Delta, which ultimately was extinguished 
pursuant to Delta's chapter 11 plan. App. 232a. 
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Eastern ultimately agreed to reduce its $2.2 million claim 
to $900,000 and withdrew its opposition to the sale of 
Delta's assets, and consented to the amendment of Delta's 
liquidating chapter 11 plan to provide a fund to pay 
unsecured creditors a portion of their claims. Eastern's pro 
rata distribution was slightly more than $380,000, 
approximately 42% of its $900,000 claim. 
 
In October 1997, after Delta's bankruptcy case was 
closed, Eastern filed a complaint in the York County Court 
of Common Pleas naming Mahan as defendant. Eastern 
sought to recover $580,783.13, the remaining 58% of the 
$900,000 claim that Eastern did not receive from Delta by 
piercing the corporate veil on an alter ego theory. App. 649a.6 
Eastern alleged that Mahan caused Delta to be 
undercapitalized, "pilfered" corporate opportunity, and 
acted to further his own personal ends, thereby abusing 
corporate privilege and breaching his fiduciary duty and his 
duty of loyalty.7 App. 650a, 668a. The complaint provides 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The " `classical' piercing of the corporate veil is an equitable remedy 
whereby a court disregards `the existence of the corporation to make the 
corporation's individual principals and their personal assets liable for 
the 
debts of the corporation.' " In re Blatstein, 192 F.3d 88, 100 (3d Cir. 
1999) (quoting In re Schuster, 132 B.R. 604, 607 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) 
(citations omitted)). We have commented that "Pennsylvania, like New 
Jersey, does not allow recovery unless the party seeking to pierce the 
corporate veil on an alter ego theory establishes that the controlling 
corporation wholly ignored the separate status of the controlled 
corporation and so dominated and controlled its affairs that its separate 
existence was a mere sham. . . . In other words, both Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey require a threshold showing that the controlled corporation 
acted robot- or puppet-like in mechanical response to the controller's 
tugs on its strings or pressure on its buttons." Culbreth v. Amosa (Pty) 
Ltd., 898 F.2d 13, 14-15 (3d Cir. 1990) (per curiam). See generally 
Lumax Indus., Inc. v. Aultman, 669 A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. 1995) (listing 
factors for disregarding the corporate form as "undercapitalization, 
failure to adhere to corporate formalities, substantial intermingling of 
corporate and personal affairs and use of the corporate form to 
perpetrate a fraud"); Ashley v. Ashley, 393 A.2d 637, 641 (Pa. 1978) 
("[w]e have said that whenever one in control of a corporation uses that 
control, or uses the corporate assets, to further his or her own personal 
interests, the fiction of the separate corporate entity may properly be 
disregarded"). 
 
7. The alter ego theory comes into play in piercing the corporate veil 
when one seeks to hold liable an individual owner who controls the 
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the following summary of the factual basis for Eastern's 
action: 
 
       By way of conclusory overview . . . Eastern contends 
       that Mahan invested heavily in Delta in the late '80s, 
       realized his investment was in trouble by the end of 
       1991, and spent the next several years designing and 
       implementing a course of conduct calculated to shift 
       the risk of loss from himself and other affiliated alter 
       egos of Delta, to Eastern and other trade creditors. 
       Mahan's manipulation began with garden variety 
       pilfering of corporate opportunity and breach of 
       fiduciary obligation, continued with highly 
       inappropriate conversion of his equity investment to 
       secured indebtedness at a time when the company was 
       both undercapitalized and insolvent, and culminated in 
       his use and abuse of the federal bankruptcy system to 
       assure for himself and other alter egos, the benefit of 
       the unconscionable advantage he had taken. Along the 
       way he routinely ignored verbal commitments and 
       acted in knowing and intentional violation of written 
       agreements. Self dealing, misrepresentation, and deceit 
       were the order of the day. Mahan continuously and 
       unabashedly used Delta and other affiliated entities as 
       the means for the achievement of personal ends. 
       Especially as pertains to Eastern, an involuntary 
       creditor of Delta, giving regard and effect to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
corporation. See S.T. Hudson Engineers v. Camden Hotel Dev. Assoc., 
747 A.2d 931, 936 (Pa. Super. 2000); Miners, Inc. v. Alpine Equip. Corp., 
722 A.2d 691, 695 (Pa. Super. 1998) (citing Kaplan v. First Options of 
Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1521 (3d Cir. 1994), aff 'd, 514 U.S. 938 
(1995)). Factors considered under Pennsylvania law, for example, with 
respect to the alter ego theory include, but are not limited to, the 
following: "[T]he failure to observe corporate formalities; non-payment of 
dividends; insolvency of debtor corporation; siphoning the funds from 
corporation by dominant shareholders; non-functioning of other officers 
and directors; absence of corporate records; whether the corporation is 
a mere facade for the operations of a common shareholder or 
shareholders; and gross undercapitalization." Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel 
Corp. v. Intersteel, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1054, 1059 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (citing 
Galgay v. Gangloff, 677 F. Supp. 295, 300 (M.D. Pa. 1987)). See also 
United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 88 (3d Cir. 1981). 
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       corporate form of organization would result in 
       perpetration of fraud, illegality, or injustice, would 
       defeat public policy, and would render the entire theory 
       of corporate existence useless. 
 
App. 650a-651a. Specifically, Eastern's complaint contends 
that Delta was severely undercapitalized and that Mahan 
engaged in a pattern of improper conduct: 
 
       Among other things, prior to the filing of the 
       Bankruptcy Case, Mahan (i) set up a competing 
       company, violating the corporate opportunity doctrine, 
       (ii) caused Delta to prefer Millington over other 
       creditors, in violation of fiduciary responsibility, when 
       he granted a blanket security interest in 
       unencumbered assets in 1992, (iii) caused Delta to pay 
       Millington, Rockcrest and other Affiliated Entities 
       management, development, and administrative fees 
       that were not bona fide fees; (iv) caused Delta to violate 
       along with Penroc [sic.], the restrictive covenant 
       assumed by Delta in connection with the Bestone 
       transaction, and (v) caused Delta to mislead creditors 
       with conflicting UCC filings and descriptions subject to 
       Millington's security interest. During the pendency of 
       the Bankruptcy Case, through his company's attorney, 
       Mahan (i) treated the Affiliated Entities as though they 
       were alter egos of each other and himself, (ii) misled 
       gullible Committee counsel and the Bankruptcy Court 
       to believe that Millington held a secured position 
       justifying a post-petition payment (before plan 
       confirmation) in the amount of $4.7 million, when in 
       fact it did not, and (iii) made every decision entrusted 
       to Delta as debtor-in-possession with a view toward 
       promoting his own self interest, not the interest of the 
       estate generally. 
 
App. 669a-670a. In December 1997, the action was 
removed to the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania. 
 
Mahan filed a motion to dismiss Eastern's complaint on 
several grounds, including the affirmative defense of claim 
preclusion. App. 12a. The District Court found that the first 
element of claim preclusion -- that the first suit was a final 
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judgment on the merits -- was satisfied by the entry of the 
plan confirmation order in Delta's bankruptcy case. The 
second element of claim preclusion -- that thefirst suit was 
between the same parties or their privies -- similarly was 
held to be satisfied. The District Court concluded that it 
could not determine from the complaint whether the third 
element was satisfied, namely, whether Eastern's action 
against Mahan was based on the same cause of action as 
Delta's confirmation order, and therefore denied the motion 
to dismiss, but considered the issue on summary judgment 
shortly thereafter. 
 
In the context of the summary judgment motion, Mahan 
argued that the record -- including Eastern's draft 
complaint seeking equitable subordination in Delta's 
bankruptcy case, which the District Court noted"parallels 
the material averments of the complaint in the instant 
case" -- demonstrated that Eastern knew all of the facts 
supporting its instant cause of action against Mahan while 
Delta's bankruptcy case was unfolding. Slip Op. at 4. 
Mahan also argued that there was ample precedent for the 
Bankruptcy Court to exercise jurisdiction over alter ego 
claims. Eastern contended that the chapter 11 plan had not 
specifically provided for the extinguishment of Eastern's 
claim against Mahan, that there would have been no 
subject matter jurisdiction, and that barring his claim 
would burden bankruptcy courts with every claim creditors 
may have against third parties. 
 
Although the District Court correctly set forth the third 
element of claim preclusion at the outset, e.g. , that the later 
claim is based on the same cause of action as the prior 
claim, the Court ultimately re-stated the test incorrectly 
when it concluded that "it appears that claim preclusion 
should bar the instant action because it is based on a 
cause of action that could have been raised in the 
bankruptcy proceedings, but for whatever reason, was not." 
Slip Op. at 5. In other words, the District Court's claim 
preclusion ruling is not predicated on a finding that 
Eastern's instant claim against Mahan is based on the 
same cause of action as a claim raised by Eastern in 
Delta's bankruptcy. Interestingly, the District Court later 
expressed second thoughts regarding this ruling, but that 
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is not before us.8 The District Court also rejected Eastern's 
concerns regarding the lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
over Eastern's claim. 
 
Urging us to affirm the District Court's ruling that 
Eastern's complaint against Mahan is barred, Mahan 
emphasizes that Eastern knew all the facts necessary to 
assert its present claim during Delta's bankruptcy, and 
that Eastern's present claim against Mahan arises out of 
the same cause of action that Eastern raised in Delta's 
bankruptcy case.9 Eastern argues that the District Court 
erred by applying the claim preclusion test to bar the 
second action even if the prior proceeding did not involve 
the same cause of action, that it is not pursuing the same 
cause of action that was at issue in Delta's bankruptcy 
case, and that the District Court's ruling, if affirmed, would 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In a separate RICO lawsuit brought by Eastern against Mahan, the 
District Court denied summary judgment on the basis of claim 
preclusion on October 21, 1999. The Judge stated he believed he had 
erred in granting Mahan's motion for summary judgment on Eastern's 
complaint at issue here: 
 
       [W]e have concluded that we erred in the No. 97-1941 
       memorandum. . . . Our ruling in No. 97-1941 was based on an 
       unstated, but erroneous, premise -- that an alter ego of the debtor 
       was the debtor for all intents and purposes. . . .[N]either Mahan 
nor 
       Millington, even as an alter ego of Delta, can be considered the 
       debtor and entitled to force their creditors to pursue their claims 
       against them in the Delta bankruptcy. To the contrary, section 
       524(e) would prohibit them from invoking Delta's discharge in 
       bankruptcy. . . . . No. 97-1941 was an alter ego action against 
       Mahan alone for Delta's breach of the sales agency agreement. That 
       case was erroneously dismissed on the basis of claim preclusion. 
 
Slip Op. 99-0366 at 23-28 (emphasis added) (appended to Reply Brief for 
Appellants). 
 
9. Mahan also asks that we reject Eastern's arguments relating to the 
Bankruptcy Court's putative jurisdiction over Eastern's instant claim 
against Mahan and to whether applying claim preclusion to bar 
Eastern's claim would amount to an impermissible discharge of a 
nondebtor in violation of 11 U.S.C. S 524(e). Based on our conclusion 
that Eastern's current complaint against Mahan does not arise out of the 
same cause of action as its claims raised in Delta's bankruptcy and thus 
is not barred, we need not reach these issues. 
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mean that the entry of a confirmation order in a chapter 11 
bankruptcy case bars every claim that might have been 
asserted in the bankruptcy.10 
 
Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment 
on the merits of an action involving the same parties (or 
their privies) bars a subsequent suit based on the same 
cause of action. See Gillman v. Continental Airlines (In re 
Continental Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2000); 
Arab African Int'l Bank v. Epstein, 10 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 




10. In light of the fact that some of Eastern's allegations stem from 
events occurring during the course of Delta's bankruptcy, Eastern also 
asserts that its claim against Mahan cannot be barred because it had 
not yet accrued at the time of the first action. Although we do not read 
the assertions in Eastern's complaint to arise only out of post- 
confirmation conduct or events, we need not reach this issue. 
 
11. Eastern does not challenge the District Court's findings with respect 
to the first two elements, namely, that the Delta confirmation order, 
inclusive of the settlement, was a final judgment and that it involved 
both Eastern and Mahan. Although Eastern's failure to challenge the 
applicability of the first two elements of claim preclusion does not 
affect 
the outcome of this appeal due to our conclusion that the third element 
of claim preclusion is not satisfied, we question whether the District 
Court too readily assumed and concluded that thefirst "dispute" in 
Delta's bankruptcy case involved the same parties or their privies as 
Eastern's current suit against Mahan. The District Court reasoned that 
"Plaintiff 's claims against Defendant are premised on Plaintiff 's theory 
that Delta was Defendant's alter ego. If Plaintiff can establish that this 
was so, then Defendant was a party to Delta's bankruptcy proceedings 
for preclusion purposes." App. 94a (citation omitted). Although we have 
held, in a unique factual context, that a creditor's objection to a 
chapter 
11 plan could be considered a claim against another creditor for claim 
preclusion purposes, see CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Huls America, Inc., 
176 F.3d 187, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1999), the circumstances that gave rise 
to our narrow holding in that case are not present here. Nor do we 
believe it appropriate to assume solely on the basis of Eastern's current 
veil piercing lawsuit that Mahan was Delta's privy, as the District Court 
did in its decision denying Mahan's motion to dismiss. As to the first 
element, we recognize that an order confirming a chapter 11 plan is a 
final order "on the merits," but we do not decide whether those merits 
can be equated to the merits of the instant dispute. Cf. Huls, 176 F.3d 
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Before embarking on our analysis, it is important to 
identify what is not at issue. No one disputes that Eastern 
was an active participant in Delta's bankruptcy case, and 
filed a number of motions and objections claiming 
inequitable conduct on the part of various entities 
controlled by Mahan. Equally clear is that Eastern did not 
raise the precise claim that is the subject of this complaint, 
namely, that Mahan's conduct warrants piercing Delta's 
corporate veil and holding Mahan liable on an alter ego 
theory. The parties also acknowledge that claim preclusion 
does not bar all unasserted claims that theoretically could 
have been raised, but only those based on the same cause 
of action that was actually asserted previously. See Brief for 
Appellee at 33 ("Mahan has never argued that all possible 
causes of action must be raised in a bankruptcy such as 
Delta's. What he argued, and proved, is that claims which 
are known and asserted in a bankruptcy proceeding cannot 
later be asserted elsewhere."); Brief for Appellant at 18 ("in 
the absence of actual assertion of a cause of action in the 
bankruptcy proceeding, claim preclusion does not follow"). 
See generally Huls, 176 F.3d at 191 ("Claim preclusion bars 
a party from litigating a claim that it could have raised or 
did raise in a prior proceeding in which it raised another 
claim based on the same cause of action.") (emphasis 
added). 
 
The issue facing us, therefore, is whether the claim 
currently being asserted by Eastern against Mahan is  
based on the same cause of action as the claims actually 
asserted by Eastern in Delta's bankruptcy such that its 
instant claim should have been asserted in that forum. 
Mahan says it is; Eastern says it is not. 
 
Our case law often suggests that we consider whether 
there is an "essential similarity of the underlying events" to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
at 206 (holding that merits of dispute regarding competing interest in 
$600,000 were specifically resolved in confirmation order); First Union 
Comm. Corp. v. Nelson, Mullins, Riley and Scarborough (In re Varat 
Enterprises, Inc.), 81 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1996) (barring lender 
from raising postconfirmation objection to secured claim of law firm 
when its claim was specifically addressed and resolved in context of plan 
confirmation). 
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determine whether the prior and current claim arise from 
the same cause of action and cite to United States v. 
Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984). 
Although we stated this test in Athlone, we did not actually 
apply it, ultimately holding instead that the district court 
erred in dismissing the action because "the suits involved 
different statutes, different acts, different wrongs, and 
necessitated different evidence to support the different 
material facts alleged." Id. at 986. See also Lewison Bros. v. 
Washington Savings Bank (In re Lewison Bros.), 162 B.R. 
974, 981 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993) (explaining that Athlone 
instructed that courts determine whether suits involve the 
same causes of action by comparing the acts and demand 
for relief, theory of recovery, necessary evidence, and 
alleged material facts). Furthermore, the "essential 
similarity" test, when literally construed, is ideally suited 
for litigation that has been generated by discrete events, 
such as a car accident or commercial transaction gone 
awry; indeed, claim preclusion is typically invoked when 
issues surrounding a discrete incident or transaction have 
been litigated previously in a civil action. However, the 
claim at risk of being precluded in this case is based on 
conduct that allegedly took place over the course of several 
years. Although some of the underlying events and 
relationships are described in terms that are similar (and 
indeed sometimes nearly identical) in both Eastern's 
complaint against Mahan and various documents Eastern 
circulated in Delta's bankruptcy case (e.g., the draft 
equitable subordination complaint), the similarity of certain 
events in and of itself does not trigger a bar of Eastern's 
subsequent complaint against Mahan. Surely the mere 
existence of overlapping facts and events in this setting is 
not sufficient to foreclose Eastern's current claim. To 
properly apply the affirmative defense of claim preclusion, 
we must take a closer look. 
 
Claim preclusion is complicated in this case not only 
because the instant claim involves a multifaceted factual 
scenario and extensive course of events, but also because 
the prior litigation involved an expansive and complex 
chapter 11 bankruptcy case. A bankruptcy case is not a 
discrete lawsuit. It is commenced by the filing of a petition 
for relief, which then provides a forum in which any 
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number of adversary proceedings, contested matters, and 
claims will be litigated. Claim preclusion only bars claims 
arising from the same cause of action previously raised, not 
every conceivable claim that could have been brought in the 
context of a bankruptcy case over which the court would 
have had jurisdiction.12 
 
Claim preclusion doctrine must be properly tailored to 
the unique circumstances that arise when the previous 
litigation took place in the context of a bankruptcy case.13 
Difficult as it may be to define the contours of a cause of 
action in a bankruptcy setting, we conclude that a claim 
should not be barred unless the factual underpinnings, 
theory of the case, and relief sought against the parties to 
the proceeding are so close to a claim actually litigated in 
the bankruptcy that it would be unreasonable not to have 
brought them both at the same time in the bankruptcy  
forum.14 Here, that is not the case. 
 
Eastern's participation in Delta's bankruptcy case, as 
previously described, was undoubtedly active and 
aggressive. Yet, Eastern never litigated any cause of action 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Claim preclusion would have a broad scope indeed if it barred every 
claim over which a bankruptcy court might have had jurisdiction. See 
Huls, 176 F.3d at 209 (Stapleton, J., dissenting) (noting that a broad 
view of claim preclusion in the bankruptcy context would likely produce 
"multitudinous protective filings of claims against nondebtors and the 
needless complication of bankruptcy confirmation proceedings"). 
 
13. Indeed, the factual setting here -- involving a closely-held debtor 
corporation that is part of a group of such companies controlled by one 
shareholder -- raises special problems, yet is all too common. Surely it 
cannot be the case that the corporation's bankruptcy becomes the 
exclusive forum to address any claims a creditor might have against the 
nondebtor controlling shareholder based on that shareholder's own 
conduct. 
 
14. This is, after all, essentially the test that we actually applied in 
Athlone, and it is consistent with the reasoning in Huls, in which we 
recognized that courts normally must scrutinize the"totality of the 
circumstances" to determine whether two claims are based on the same 
cause of action, although we found that the claims'"essential similarity" 
was facially apparent in that particular instance. See Huls, 176 F.3d at 
206. This test, of course, assumes subject matter jurisdiction over the 
later claim. 
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against Mahan that sought what its current claim would 
accomplish. The claim most closely resembling the current 
action was Eastern's draft equitable subordination 
complaint, which was never actually filed and which sought 
to subordinate the claims of Millington and Chemical Bank, 
not Mahan. Characterizing Millington's claim as equity or 
capital rather than "debt," Eastern's draft complaint 
essentially took the position that Millington should not 
have creditor status in Delta's bankruptcy, but instead 
should stand in line behind Delta's other creditors. Unlike 
that draft equitable subordination complaint, Eastern's 
instant complaint seeks recovery from Mahan and focuses 
not on whether Millington should have equivalent creditor 
status or whether Delta's assets were properly used to 
collateralize obligations of Millington to Chemical Bank, but 
rather on whether Mahan should be personally liable for 
the debt due to Eastern based on his conduct in using 
Delta as his "mere instrumentality" and "alter ego" for his 
individual benefit.15 Although some of the descriptions of 
certain events and particular relationships are common to 
both claims, the theory of the case and relief sought in 
Eastern's instant complaint are markedly different from 
those underlying the draft complaint to subordinate the 
claims of Millington and Chemical Bank that Eastern 
considered filing in bankruptcy court. 
 
Both Eastern and Mahan take the position that our 
decision in Huls dictates that they prevail on their 
respective positions as to whether Eastern's suit against 
Mahan is barred. Huls involved a lawsuit between two 
lenders, CoreStates and Huls, based on a subordination 
agreement between them. After the conclusion of the 
bankruptcy case of their mutual borrower, United Chemical 
Technologies ("UCT"), CoreStates sued Huls to recover 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. We recognize that other courts of appeals have considered whether 
the claim holder has used the debtor as an alter ego when deciding 
whether a claimant has engaged in inequitable conduct such that its 
claim should be equitably subordinated. See, e.g., In re Lifschultz Fast 
Freight, 132 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 1997). However, even if we employed 
that analysis in this circuit, it would not affect the outcome here, 
particularly because Eastern sought to subordinate the claim of 
Millington, not Mahan. 
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$600,000 that Huls had received in the case. Hulsfiled a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the claim 
preclusive effect of UCT's bankruptcy confirmation order. In 
UCT's bankruptcy case, CoreStates had specifically 
challenged the $600,000 payment to Huls by way of formal 
objection as well as informal colloquy with the parties and 
the court. CoreStates also had appealed the court's entry of 
the confirmation order, which, although overturned on 
different grounds, was ultimately followed by the successful 
confirmation of a second amended plan. 
 
We affirmed the District Court's decision that claim 
preclusion barred CoreStates' later suit. The underlying 
question in Huls was whether "CoreStates has a right to 
receive the funds, when both CoreStates's and Huls's rights 
in the bankruptcy estate, and CoreStates's objection based 
on the payment in particular, were settled in the 
confirmation proceeding." Huls, 176 F.3d at 190-191. We 
concluded that "CoreStates functionally raised the 
Subordination Agreement in its objection to the 
Reorganization Plan," id. at 203, and that CoreStates's 
objection in UCT's confirmation proceedings was, in fact, a 
claim against Huls: 
 
       The objection put Huls's rights in the bankruptcy 
       estate into question. The $600,000 payment was all 
       Huls was entitled to receive under the Reorganization 
       Plan. A challenge to that payment amounted to a 
       challenge to Huls's position in the scheme of 
       distribution the Plan envisioned. In addition, Huls 
       clearly felt that it had an interest in the issue worth 
       preserving, since it opposed the objection extensively 
       throughout the bankruptcy proceedings. Furthermore, 
       Huls filed a brief in opposition to CoreStates's appeal 
       in the District Court, and CoreStates filed a reply brief 
       dealing almost solely with Huls's arguments. 
       Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Judge's dismissal of 
       CoreStates's objection and the subsequent 
       confirmation of the Plan constitute a final judgment on 
       CoreStates's claim against Huls. 
 
Id. at 206. Noting that our holding was largely fact-bound 
and was the result of "the coincidence of several unusual 
circumstances," we emphasized the significance of the fact 
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that CoreStates specifically challenged the fairness of 
providing the $600,000 to Huls in the plan of 
reorganization: "in the absence of extensive litigation of this 
claim in the confirmation proceeding, CoreStates would not 
now be prevented from bringing its suit." Id.  at 206. In 
other words, CoreStates actually litigated the same cause of 
action -- Huls' entitlement to the $600,000 as opposed to 
CoreStates' -- in the plan confirmation process that it 
sought to litigate thereafter. 
 
Huls illustrates, in what we recognized to be a somewhat 
unique factual and procedural setting, that one does not 
get a second bite at the proverbial apple simply because the 
first bite was taken in a bankruptcy case. See Huls, 176 
F.3d at 202 (citations omitted). Similarly, we note that care 
must be taken in determining whether the first bite was 
actually taken such that it would preclude the second. Huls 
does not stand for the proposition that nondebtors must 
assert all potential claims in a bankruptcy case or be 
forever barred, nor does Mahan ask us to reach such a 
conclusion. Rather, Huls helps us frame the key question 
that the parties agree we should ask whenever the 
affirmative defense of claim preclusion is raised on the 
basis of a prior bankruptcy confirmation order, namely, 
whether the later claim arises from the same cause of action 
as a claim that was actually asserted or interposed in the 
earlier bankruptcy case and resolved in the confirmation 
order. Here, we have concluded that it does not. 16 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Eastern's 
suit against Mahan is not barred and we will, therefore, 
reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment and 
remand for further proceedings. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Recent decisions of other courts bolster our interpretation as to how 
claim preclusion is reasonably applied in the context of bankruptcy. For 
example, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently concluded 
that a hearing determining the fees earned by an accounting firm for 
services rendered to the bankruptcy estate barred the bankruptcy 
trustee from later suing the accounting firm for negligence and 
professional malpractice because both disputes squarely presented the 
identical question of the quality and value of thefirm's services to the 
bankruptcy estate. See Osherow v. Ernst & Young, LLP (In re Intelogic 
Trace, Inc.), 200 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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Denial of Eastern's Motion to Amend 
 
Eastern also appeals the District Court's denial of 
Eastern's motion requesting leave to amend its complaint a 
second time to add RICO claims against Mahan and to join 
two additional defendants.17 Eastern contends that the 
District Court erroneously relied on Rule 16(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without sufficient 
consideration of Rules 15(a) and 42. We review the District 
Court's determination for abuse of discretion. See Epstein, 
10 F.3d at 174. 
 
The District Court's case management conference order 
set the amendment and joinder deadlines for June 30, 
1998. App. 121a-122a. On January 6, 1999, more than six 
months after the deadline, Eastern filed its motion for leave 
to amend. App. 124a. As justification for seeking leave to 
amend, Eastern stated that it had become aware of the 
viability of new claims and that filing an amended 
complaint would conserve judicial resources and would 
obviate the need for a separate action. App. 125a. Opposing 
Eastern's motion, Mahan argued that Eastern had to 
comply with Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure before seeking amendment under Rule 15(a); 18 
because Eastern had not been diligent, Mahan contended, 
the amendment should not be allowed under Rule 16(b). 
Slip Op. at 5. 
 
Agreeing with Mahan's reasoning, the District Court 
concluded that good cause had not been shown under Rule 
16(b) to modify the case management order. According to 
the District Court, Eastern had not specified what led it to 
decide that RICO claims could be pled or why information 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. The District Court denied this motion on March 1, 1999, prior to 
granting summary judgment. 
 
18. Rule 15(a), "Amended and Supplemental Pleadings," provides that 
under most circumstances, a party seeking to amend more than once 
may do so only by leave of court or with the adverse party's written 
consent, although "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." 
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). Rule 16(b) instructs courts to set time limits in 
connection with pretrial conferences, and a "schedule shall not be 
modified except upon a showing of good cause and by leave of the 
district judge." FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b). 
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from independent sources could not have been obtained 
earlier. Slip Op at 6. The District Court concluded that it 
need not examine Eastern's Rule 15(a) argument, but 
nonetheless noted that there was sufficient reason to deny 
Eastern's motion under Rule 15(a) due to Eastern's 
unexplained delay in moving to amend. 
 
We conclude that the District Court acted well within its 
discretion when it denied Eastern's motion to amend the 
complaint six months after the amendment and joinder 
deadlines had expired, and we will not disturb the Court's 
ruling in this regard.19 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will REVERSE the District 
Court's entry of summary judgment. We will AFFIRM the 
District Court's denial of Eastern's untimely motion to 
amend its complaint. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Eastern has withdrawn the third issue it originally listed for appeal, 
namely the District Court's denial of Eastern's request to file an 
outsized 
brief. See Reply Brief of Appellants, at 8. 
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